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LEGISLATION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO AUTHORIZE CONDEMNA-
TION OF NON-RESIDENTIAL "BLIGHTED" AREAS FOR SUBSEQUENT SALE TO
PRIVATE DEVELOPERS.-The United States Supreme Court has upheld the
power of Congress to authorize the condemnation of property in a "blighted"
area in the District of Columbia, in furtherance of an urban redevelopment
program, even though not all the condemned property is substandard, and
even though the property seized is subsequently transferred to private in-
terests for redevelopment. 1
Plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin condemnation of their property, a de-
partment store, under the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.2
The theory of the suit was that the act was unconstitutional in that it
authorized the sale or lease of private property taken by eminent domain
to other private persons for private use, and authorized condemnation of
property in "blighted" areas without sufficient definition of that term to
meet constitutional standards. Plaintiff also argued that the statute was un-
constitutional in its application to their property, which was commercial,
and not slum housing. From a partially adverse judgment of the District
Court,3 plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court on constitutional
grounds. 4
Modifying the judgment of the District Court, which upheld the validi-
ty of the act only as applied to the reasonable necessities of slum clearance
and prevention, the Supreme Court held that Congress had the power to
authorize the seizure of private property in the District of Columbia not
only for purposes of slum clearance and prevention, but also for the com-
prehensive redevelopment of an entire "blighted" area, with provision not
only for new homes, but also for adequate schools, churches, parks, streets
and shopping centers. In a forcefully worded opinion, Justice Douglas de-
clared that, subject to specific constitutional limitations, it is up to Con-
gress, which has all of the powers over the District of Columbia which
a state exercises over its own affairs, 5 to determine which public needs are
to be served by social legislation, 6 and that the object of the act was within
the authority of Congress under the police power.
Refusing to disturb the congressional finding that "the acquisition of
and the assembly of real property and the leasing and sale thereof for
redevelopment pursuant to a project area redevelopment plan [is] a public
use"7 the court declared that redevelopment of an entire "blighted" area "is
plainly relevant to the maintenance of the desired housing standards and
therefore within congressional power." Thus, "property may . . . be taken
1 Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 75 S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 63 (1954).
2 60 STAT. 790 (1945), D. C. CoDE 1951 §§ 5-701-5-719.
3 Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D. D. C. 1953).
4 28 U. S. C. § 1253 (1952).
5 District of Columbia v. Thompson Co., 346 U. S. 100, 73 S. Ct. 1007, 97 L. Ed.
1480 (1953).
6 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865 (1920).
7 See note 2, supra.
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for this development which, standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffend-
ing."8 Nor does the fact that the property could be sold or leased to pri-
vate interests, subsequent to seizure, for redevelopment in accordance with
approved plans, affect the constitutionality of the act, for "the means of
executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine,
once the public purpose has been established."9 Holding that the standards
contained in the act are sufficiently definite to authorize the administrative
agencies to execute approved plans to eliminate not only slums, but also the
blighted areas which tend to produce slums, the court concluded that the
"rights of property owners are satisfied when they receive that just com-
pensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking."' 0
The power of eminent domain applies only to the taking of property
for a "public use," which the courts originally defined very narrowly.'
It is only thirty-three years since a Massachusetts statute providing for the
use of public funds to provide homes for wage earners away from congested
areas was held to be unconstitutional on the grounds that the use proposed
was not a public use.' 2 But with the continued growth and overcrowding
of our cities, the increasing complexity of urban living and changing atti-
tudes toward the role of government, the concept of "public use" has been
greatly expanded to the point where today the taking of property itself, as
distinguished from the subsequent use of that property, may be required in
the public interest..
3
Even before the great depression of the nineteen-thirties, the creation
of a municipal housing commission, with authority to use eminent domain
in providing homes for those who might otherwise live in unhealthy slums,
was held to be for a public purpose, and therefore valid.' 4 Projects for the
clearance and reconstruction of slum areas and for low-cost housing involv-
ing the use of eminent domain were held to be public uses in New York
in 1936.15 Following passage of the United States Housing Act of 1937,16
under which the federal government furnished financial assistance to state
and local housing authorities, many states passed slum clearance enabling
acts authorizing the use of eminent domain, practically all of which were
upheld by the courts.' 7 These statutes provided for construction of low
cost housing upon the property taken, which was to be managed by public
agencies. A new question was introduced when legislation was later enacted
in a large number of states authorizing the sale or lease of property in slum
S See note 1, supra, at 35.
9 Id. at33.
10 Id. at 36.
11 See Redevelopment Agency of City and County of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122
Cal. App. 2d 777, 266 P. 2d 105 (1954).
12 Opinion of justices, 211 Mass. 624, 98 N. E. 611 (1912).
13 See note 11, supra.
14 Willmon v. Powell, 91 Cal. App. 1, 266 P. 1029 (1928).
15 New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N. Y. 333, 1 N. E. 2d 153
(1936).
16 50 STAT. 888 (1937), 42 U. S. C. § 1401 (1952).
17 Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill. 356, 19 N. E. 2d 193 (1939);
Edwards v. Housing Authority, 215 Ind. 33, 19 N. E. 2d 741 (1939).
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areas obtained through eminent domain to private interests for redevelop-
ment. Such legislation, however, also has been almost always upheld.18
Thus, in a case involving the Stuyvesant Town project in New York City,
it was held that condemnation of private property was for a public use,
even though the property was to be transferred to a private corporation
which expected to reap a profit, and even though the housing to be con-
structed was not low cost.19 But in two cases, statutes authorizing the sale
of condemned property to private interests for industrial use have been
struck down as unconstitutional.
2 0
In the light of these prior cases which dealt with the use of eminent
domain in urban redevelopment projects, the Supreme Court's decision in
the Berman case2l is significant for its consideration of this problem: what
type of area may be subject to condemnation for purposes of rehabilitation?
Formerly, most of the statutes on the subject spoke only of slum areas,
although in recent years a few statutes have referred to "blighted areas" or
"slum and blighted areas," and the District of Columbia Act in issue in the
instant case, mentions "substandard housing and blighted areas."
Until this decision, most courts have held that these statutes are valid
only as applied to projects involving slum clearance and prevention, as did
the United States District Court in the instant case. 22 The New York Court
of Appeals has held that the New York statute under which the Colum-
bus Circle area in New York City is being redeveloped can only be applied
if the project is primarily for slum clearance purposes.2 3 In a recent decision
in Maine, it was held that the taking of property for the purpose of cor-
recting faulty lot layout and deterioration of sites, and for a mixture of in-
compatible land uses, which produced a condition impairing the sound
growth of a municipality and constituted an economic and social liability,
was not a public use.
24
However, some courts have recognized that property may be taken for
other than purely slum clearance purposes, provided that a compelling
community economic need is being met.25 In Pennsylvania a project pro-
viding for the seizure of a blighted commercial and industrial area, which
was to be developed for non-residential purposes, was approved,20 as was a
18 Zinn v. City of Chicago, 389 I1. 114, 59 N. E. 2d 118 (1945); Belousky v.
Redevelopment Authority, 357 -Pa. 329, 54 A. 2d 277 (1947); In re Slum Clearance
in City of Detroit, 331 Mich. 714, 50 N. W. 2d 340 (1951); Hunter v. Norfolk Devel-
opment and Housing Authority, 195 Va. 326, 78 S. E. 2d 893 (1953); Williamson v.
Housing Authority, 186 Ga. 673, 199 S. E. 43 (1938); Housing Authority v. Dock-
weiler, 14 Cal. 2d 437, 94 P. 2d 794 (1939); Lennox v. Housing Authority, 137 Neb.
582, 290 N. W. 451 (1940).
19 Murray v. La Guardia, 291 N. Y. 320, 52 N. E, 2d 884 (1943), cert. denied, 321
U. S. 771, 64 S. Ct. 530, 88 L. Ed. 1066 (1944).
20 Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
21 See note 1, supra; Housing Authority of Atlanta v. Johnson, 290 Ga. 56, 74
S. E. 2d 891 (1950).
22 See note 3, supra.
23 Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 306 N. Y. 73, 115 N. E. 2d 659 (1953).
24 Crommet v. City of Portland, 115 Me. 217, 107 A. 2d (1954).
25 See note 11, supla.
26 Schenck v. City of Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A. 2d 612 (1950).
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project in Illinois involving the condemnation and development of vacant
blighted land for residential purposes.2 7
In the Berman case the Supreme Court appears to have adopted a
broad view of what constitutes a public use and public purpose. "The con-
cept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . The values it repre-
sents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled. If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation's capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way."
28
ARBITRATION-WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT ARBITRATION PROCEED-
INGS NOT EFFECTIVE UNLESS IN WRITING WHICH REFERS TO SPECIFIC
EXISTING CONTROVERSY, AND SIGNED BY WAIVING PARTY.-Section 1454,
subdivision I of the New York Civil Practice Act has been amended to
read as follows, effective September 1, 1953.---"No waiver of the right to
be represented by an attorney in any proceeding before an arbitrator shall
be effective unless evidenced by a writing expressly so providing in connec-
tion with an existing controversy signed by the party sought to be charged
therewith."'
The issue of whether or not parties to an arbitration proceeding have a
right to counsel during the proceedings has troubled the courts for many
years. It has been held that, in the absence of a stipulation in the agree-
ment of submission, the parties have no absolute right to the assistance of
counsel in hearings before arbitrators.2 In England, a judge has stated,
"in point of law, I think an arbitrator has a right to refuse to hear coun-
sel, in his discretion. At the same time, there are undoubtedly many cases
where an arbitrator, who is anxious to do his duties impartially, would
be wrong in refusing a party the privilege of appearing by counsel."3 In
North Carolina, the parties to an arbitration do not have a right to the
assistance of counsel in hearings before arbitrators if they make no request
for counsel.4 Illinois has held that either party has a right to be repre-
sented before arbitrators by counsel.- In 1909, a New York Appellate Divi-
sion case held that "while arbitrations are frequently and very properly
conducted without the presence of counsel, it constitutes misconduct for the
arbitrators to permit one party to be represented and assisted by counsel,
27 People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 111 N. E. 2d 626
(1953).
28 See note 1, supra, at 33, 75 S. Ct. 98, 105, 99 L. Ed. 63, 70 (1954).
1 N. Y. L. 1953, c. 556.
2 Gardner v. Newman, 135 Ala. 522, 33 So. 179 (1902).
3 William, J., in 1942 REPRINT 312.
4 P. Zell & Sons v. Johnson, 76 N. C. 302 (1877).
5 Wechsler v. Gidwitz, 250 Ill. App. 136 (1939); Stone v. Baldwin, 226 Ill.
338, 80 N. E. 890 (1907).
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and to refuse to the other party a reasonable opportunity to avail himself
of the same assistance." 6 California has followed the negative approach of
Massachusetts in Blodgett v. Prince,7 in holding that the momentary pres-
ence of counsel for one of the parties only does not vitiate the award.8 A
1948 New York case held that arbitrators, although entitled under their
rules to exclude any member of the legal profession from a hearing, had no
right to prevent the stenographer of one of the parties from taking tlie
minutes of the hearing for that party's use.9
After complaints had been made to the Judicial Council of New York
that counsel had been denied the right to represent and advise their cli-
ents at hearings under the prevailing rules of some arbitration associations,
the Council determined to study the matter. It was discovered that such
a denial of the right to counsel often surprised parties who, in contract-
ing, had incorporated by reference the trade rules of some association, un-
aware that one of the rules not only made arbitration the only method of
enforcing the contract, but often limited or wholly denied the right to
counsel."'
It would seem that the right to be represented by counsel was implicit
in the statute, because subdivision 1 of section 1454 before amendment,
stated that the time fixed for rendering the award might be extended by
consent of the parties or their attorneys. The Judicial Council recom-
mended, however, in each report from 1949 to 1952 that the legislature
amend section 1454 so as to assure expressly the party's right to be repre-
sented by an attorney. The present amendment accomplishes this end.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-DOMESTIC RELATIONS-AcTION TO ANNUL MAR-
mlAGE ON GROUND OF FRAUD MUST Now BE BROUGHT WITHIN THREE
YEARs OF DIscOVERY OF FRAuDn-The New York State Legislature has
adopted a three-year statute of limitations in actions to annul a marriage
on the ground of fraud, running from the moment of discovery. This
statute of limitation, effective September 1, 1955, is contained in the new
subdivision nine of Section 49 of the New York Civil Practice Act, which
section enumerates the actions that must be commenced within three years
of accrual. Such actions now include:
"An action to annul. a marriage on the ground of fraud. The cause of
action in such a case, is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery by
the plaintiff of the facts constituting the fraud, provided that if the person
is a person other than the party to the marriage whose consent was ob-
6 Matter of Picken, 130 App. Div. 88, 92, 114 N. Y. Supp. 290, 293 (1st Dept.
1900).
7 109 Mass. 44 (1871).
8 Ricconini v. Pierucci, 54 Cal. App. 606, 202 P. 344 (1921).
9 Leo Benjamin, Inc. v. McPhail Candy Corp., 81 N. Y. S. 2d 547 (Spec. T.
N. Y. Co. 1948).
10 For a discussion of the problems raised by this procedure, see Note, 1 N. Y.
L. F. 478 (1955).
11 18 N. Y. JuD. CouxciL ANN. REP. (1952).
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tained by fraud the cause of action is deemed to have accrued upon the
discovery either by such plaintiff or by such party to the marriage of the
facts constituting the fraud."'
This statutory limitation is in addition to the previous requirement
that the parties, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud,
have not voluntarily cohabited as husband and wife, before the commence-
ment of the action.2
Before the amendent (as is still the rule where force or duress are the
grounds) an immediate complete separation upon discovery was the sole
statutory condition under the Civil Practice Act 3 to the bringing of an
action to annul for fraud. No statutory time limitation was fixed. So, in
Campbell v. Campbell,4 where a husband sought to annul a marriage on the
ground of false representations by his wife of premarital chastity, the Court
of Appeals affirmed an order of the Appellate Division which had reversed
an order of Special Term denying the husband's motion to strike the defenses
of gross laches and six and ten-year statutes of limitations, which the wife
had interposed in her amended answer.
Presumably, the six-year .period alluded to was applicable in an action to
procure a judgment on the ground of fraud,5 while the ten-year period was
applicable to all actions where no other time limitation is prescribed.6 In
the Campbell case, the Court of Appeals held that neither of these statutory
limitations was applicable.
The state legislature now has expressly abolished the old "no time limi-
tation rule" by providing in the body of § 1139 of the Civil Practice Act
that an action to annul for fraud is subject to the three-year statute of
limitations provided for in § 49 of the Civil Practice Act.
7
1 N. Y. L. 1955, c. 257, eff. Sept. 1, 1955, Int. A 1358, Pr. A 1877.
2 Jacobson v. Jacobson, 207 App. Div. 238, 202 N. Y. Supp. 96 (2d Dep't 1923).
3 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1139 (1921).
4 264 N. Y. 616, 191 N. E. 480 (1934).
5 N. Y. Civ. PRc. Act § 48(5) (1939).
6 Id., § 53 (1921).
7 See note 1, supra.
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